A month after signing the armistice [on June 22, 1940], seven days after the demise of the Third Republic, Marshal [Philippe] Pétain's new regime, on its own initiative, introduced its first anti-Jewish measure. One hundred fifty years after the emancipation of the Jews of France, the rollback had started. Of the approximately 330,000 Jews in prewar France almost half were either foreigners or born of foreign parents. And among the foreigners, 55,000 had arrived between 1933 and 1939 (40,000 since 1935).1 Strident collaborationism was rarely heard in Vichy during the summer of 1940, but traditional native antisemitism was rife from the very first days. After reporting on August 16, 1940, about an expulsion campaign from Vichy on orders of the new government, the American chargé d'affaires in Pétain's capital, Robert Murphy, added: “There is no question that one of its objectives is to cause the departure of Jews. These, Laval [the deputy prime minister] told me recently, were congregating in Vichy to an alarming extent. He believed they would foment trouble and give the place a bad name. He said he would get rid of them.”2

Vichy’s first anti-Jewish decree was issued on July 17. The new law limited civil service appointments to citizens born of a French father. On July 22, a commission chaired by Justice Minister Raphael Alibert started checking all post-1927 naturalizations.3 On August 27, Vichy repealed the Marchandau Law of April 21, 1939, which forbade incitement on racial or religious grounds: The floodgates of antisemitic propaganda reopened. On August 16, a National Association of Physicians was established, whose members had to be born of French fathers. On September 10, the same limitation was applied to the legal profession.4 And, on October 3, 1940, Vichy, again on its own initiative, issued its Statut des juifs (Jewish Statute.)

In the opening paragraph of the statute, a Jew was defined as any person descending from at least three grandparents of the “Jewish race” or of two grandparents of the “Jewish race” if the spouse too was Jewish (the German definition referred to the grandparents’ religion; the French, to their race). The next paragraphs listed all the public functions from which Jews were barred. Paragraph 5 excluded Jews from all positions of ownership or responsibility in the press, theater, and film. The statute, drafted under Alibert’s supervision, was signed by Pétain and by all the members of his cabinet. The next day, October 4, a law allowed the internment of foreign Jews in special camps, if the administration of their department so decided. A commission responsible for these camps was established. The same regional administration could also compel foreign Jews to reside in places defined by the authorities.5

The October 1940 statute was approved by all members of the French government, with some individual nuances. Neither before nor later did Pétain publicly attack the Jews as such, yet he
alluded to an “anti-France” that in common ideological parlance also meant “the Jews”; moreover he strongly supported the new measures during the cabinet discussions. It seems that Laval, arguably the most influential member of the cabinet, although not a declared antisemite either, mainly thought of the benefits to be reaped in exchange from Germany; Admiral François Darlan, on the other hand, displayed open antisemitism in the French Catholic conservative tradition; as for Alibert, his hatred of Jews was closer to the Paris collaborationist brand than to the traditional Vichy mold.

In a cable sent on October 18 to Gaston Henry-Haye, Vichy’s ambassador in Washington, the secretary general of Vichy’s Foreign Ministry presented the arguments that could be used to explain the new statute to the Americans. The responsibility was, of course, that of the Jews themselves. A Léon Blum or a Jean Zay (the minister of education in Blum’s government) was accused of having propagated antinational or amoral principles; moreover they helped “hundreds of thousands of their own” to enter the country, and the like. The new legislation, it was said, neither targeted the basic rights of individuals nor threatened their private property. “The new legislation merely aims at solving definitively and without passion a problem that had become critical and to allow the peaceful existence in France of elements whom the characteristics of their race turn into a danger when they are too intimately present in the political and administrative life of the country.”

Vichy’s anti-Jewish legislation was generally well received by a majority of the population in the non-occupied zone. French popular antisemitism grew as a result of the defeat and during the following years. On October 9, 1940, the Central Agency for the Control of Telephone Communications—a listening service, in other words—reported that “hostility against the Jews remains”; on November 2 it indicated that the statute had been widely approved and even that for some it did not go far enough. Although only fourteen préfets (district governors appointed by the state) out of forty-two reported on public reactions to the statute, nine indicated positive responses and one reported mixed ones. In the midst of such a dire general situation, public opinion would of course tend to follow the measures taken by the savior and protector, the old maréchal [Pétain]. Moreover, a large segment of the population remained attentive to the spiritual guidance offered, now more than ever, by the Catholic Church. . . .

During the summer of 1940 the Catholic hierarchy had been informed of the forthcoming statute. When the assembly of cardinals and archbishops met in Lyon, on August 31, 1940, the “Jewish question” was on the agenda. Emile Guerry, adjunct bishop of Cambrai, summed up the assembly’s official stand: “In political terms, the problem is caused by a community [the Jews] that has resisted all assimilation, dispersion, and the national integration of its members taken individually. The State has the right and the duty to remain actively vigilant in order to make sure that the persistence of this unity [of the Jews] does not cause any harm to the common good of the nation, as one would do in regard to an ethnic minority or an international cartel . . . .” In other words the assembled leaders of the French Catholic Church gave their agreement to the statute that, a month later, would be announced by the government. Of course when the official announcement came, no Catholic prelate protested. Some bishops even openly supported the anti-Jewish measures.

The most immediate reason for the French Church’s attitude stemmed from the unmitigated support granted by Pétain and the new État fran-
to the reinsertion of Catholicism into French public life, particularly in education. Whereas the republic had established the separation of church and state and thus banned the use of state funds for the support of religious schools, Vichy canceled the separation and all its practical sequels: In many ways Catholicism had become the official religion of the new regime. There was more, however.

Since the French Revolution a segment of French Catholicism had remained obdurately hostile to the “ideas of 1789,” which they considered to be a Judeo-Masonic plot intent upon the destruction of Christianity. . . . The ultranationalist and antisemitic party created by Charles Maurras, the Action Française, had been excommunicated in the 1920s, but many Catholics remained strongly attached to it, and the ban was lifted by Pius XII on the eve of the war. The Action Française inspired Vichy’s Statut des Juifs, and its antisemitism belonged to the ideological profile of an influential part of the French church in 1940.

Finally, some of the most fundamental tenets of Christian religious antisemitism resurfaced among French Catholics. Thus the newspaper La Croix, which during the 1920s and 1930s had abandoned its violent anti-Jewish diatribes of the turn of the century (mainly during the Dreyfus affair), could not resist the temptation offered by the new circumstances. “Are the Jews Cursed by God?” was the title of an article published on November 30, 1940. Having justified the new statute, the author, who wrote under the pseudonym C. Martel [the name of the Frankish commander who defeated the Moorish invasion of France in 732 C.E.], reminded his readers that since the Jews themselves had called Jesus’ blood “upon their heads and those of their children,” a curse indeed existed. There was only one way of escaping it: conversion. The small French Reformed (Calvinist) Church was influenced by the general cultural-ideological stance shared by most of the country, although Pastor Marc Boegner, its leader, was to become an outspoken critic of Vichy’s anti-Jewish laws. Yet, in the summer of 1941, Boegner himself would emphasize on several occasions that his support was granted to French Jews only and that, in his opinion, the influx of Jewish immigrants had created a major problem.

In September 1940, the association of French publishers promised the German embassy in Paris that no Jewish authors, among other excluded groups, would be published or reprinted any longer: The publishers would, from then on, exercise strict self-censorship. Within days, a first list of banned books, the “liste Bernhard,” was made public, soon followed by a “liste Otto.” It was preceded by a short declaration from the association: “These are the books which by their lying and tendentious spirit have systematically poisoned French public opinion; particularly the publications of political refugees or of Jewish writers who, having betrayed the hospitality that France had granted to them, unscrupulously agitated in favor of a war from which they hoped to take advantage for their own egoistic aims.”

As a result of the Vichy laws of the summer and fall of 1940, 140 faculty members of Jewish origin, around 10 percent of the teaching body nationwide, were banned from the universities. Fourteen particularly eminent Jewish scholars were exempted from the ban on condition that they continue teaching in the Vichy zone only. The French academic community acquiesced. At the Collège de France, the most prestigious academic institution in the country, its four Jewish professors were dismissed, according to the new regulations.

The director of the Collège, Edmond Faral, had not waited for the new laws. In a January 1941
report to Vichy’s delegation in occupied France, Faral eagerly mentioned his own initiative: “The Jewish question: no Jew has taught at the Colège de France since the beginning of the academic year. That decision was taken even before the law of October 3, 1940.” In the draft of the report, the last sentence, later deleted, read as follows: “The administration had taken that decision.” When the Jews were no longer allowed to teach at the College, none of their “Aryan” colleagues protested. The same happened in all French institutions of higher learning. At the prestigious École Libre des Sciences Politiques, the assistant director, Roger Seydoux, expelled all Jewish professors when asked to do so by Karl Epting, the head of the cultural section of the German embassy in Paris. No attempts were made to obtain exemptions. 18

A Hitler-Pétain meeting took place in the little town of Montoire, on October 24, 1940: “Collaboration” between Vichy France and the Reich was officially proclaimed. . . . In early 1941, Darlan replaced the moderate Pierre-Étienne Flandin as the head of government, and the collaboration with Germany tightened. Anti-Jewish measures spread. In February 1941, out of the 47,000 foreigners imprisoned in French concentration camps, 40,000 were Jews. 19 Aryanization progressed apace. Jewish businesses were increasingly put under the control of “French” supervisors (commissaires-gérants) who had, in fact, full power to decide the businesses’ fate. . . . In April 1941, the Jews were forbidden to fill any position—from selling lottery tickets to any form of teaching—that would put them in contact with the public. Only a few “particularly deserving intellectuals” were exempted from this total professional segregation. As for the vast majority of the French population, it did not react. Anti-Jewish propaganda intensified, as did the number of acts of anti-Jewish violence. Individual expressions of sympathy were not rare, but they were volunteered in private, far from any public notice. . . .

At the beginning of 1941 the Germans decided that further coordination of the anti-Jewish measures throughout both French zones was necessary. In a January 30 meeting at military headquarters in Paris under the chairmanship of Werner Best, Kurt Lischka and Theodor Dannecker informed the participants that a central office for Jewish affairs had to be set up in France to implement the measures decided on to solve the Jewish problem in Europe. The functions of the office would be to deal with all police matters regarding the arrest, surveillance, and registration of Jews; to exercise economic control (exclusion of Jews from economic life and participation in the “restitution” of Jewish businesses into Aryan hands); to organize propaganda activities (dissemination of anti-Jewish propaganda among the French population), and to set up an anti-Jewish research institute. In the meantime the Paris Préfecture de Police was ready to assume these functions. The establishment of the new office should be left to the French authorities to avoid opposition to a German initiative; the Germans should limit themselves to “suggestions.” Everyone agreed. 20

The Germans were confident that even if the new office turned out to be less forceful than they wished (mainly in its dealings with native Jews), they would be able in due time to ensnare it in the full scope of their own policies. In reporting to Berlin on March 6, 1941, about a conversation with Darlan regarding the new office and Pétain’s wish to protect native Jews, Abetz indicated how any French reservations would be overcome: “It would be advisable,” the ambassador wrote, “to have the French Government establish this office. . . . It would thus have a valid legal foundation and its activity could then be stimulated.
through German influence in the occupied territory to such an extent that the unoccupied territory would be forced to join in the measures taken.  

On March 29, 1941, the Vichy government established the Central Office for Jewish Affairs (Commissariat Général aux Questions Juives, or CGQJ); its first chief was Xavier Vallat. Vallat belonged to the nationalist anti-Jewish tradition of the Action Française and did not share the racial antisemitism of the Nazis. Nonetheless the CGQJ soon became the hub of rapidly expanding anti-Jewish activity. Its main immediate "achievement" was the reworking of the Jewish statute of October 3, 1940. The new Statut des Juifs was accepted by the government and became law on June 2, 1941. Strangely enough, for the staunchly Catholic Vallat, baptism seemed inconsequential and, implicitly, inherited cultural-racial elements were at the core of his conception of the Jew. Only the CGQJ would be entitled to issue certificates of non-membership of the Jewish race.

It has occasionally been argued that Vichy's anti-Jewish measures and its ready cooperation with the Germans were a "rational" maneuver within the general framework of collaboration in order to maintain as much control as possible over developments in the occupied zone and to obtain a favorable bargaining position for the future status of France in Hitler's new Europe. In other words, Vichy supposedly displayed a non-ideological acceptance of Nazi goals (a "collaboration d'État" as opposed to some wild "collaborationism") in the hope of harvesting some tangible benefits in return. Political calculation was undoubtedly part of the overall picture, but Vichy's policy was also determined by the right-wing antisemitic tradition that was part and parcel of the "Révolution nationale." Moreover, collaboration d'État does not account for the facts that the French episcopate welcomed the exclusion of Jews from public life as early as August 1940 and that mainly among the rural population and the provincial Catholic middle classes antisemitism was not limited to a tiny minority but widespread. Thus, although the Vichy legislation was not dictated by the passions of French "collaborationists," it was nonetheless a calculated response both to a public mood and to ideological-institutional interests, such as those of the church.

In general, antisemitism may well have been outweighed by sheer indifference, but not to the point of forgoing tangible advantages. As [ss-Obersturmführer] Helmut Knochen put it in January 1941, "It is almost impossible to cultivate among the French an anti-Jewish sentiment that rests on an ideological foundation, while the offer of economic advantages much more easily excites sympathy for the anti-Jewish struggle." There was a striking (yet possibly unperceived at the time) relation between French attitudes toward the Jews and the behavior of representatives of native Jewry toward the foreign or recently naturalized Jews living in the country. While native Jews affiliated to the community were represented by the Consistoire [des Israelites de France] and its local branches, foreign Jews—and the recently naturalized ones—were loosely affiliated to an umbrella organization, the Fédération des Sociétés Juives de France, comprising various political associations and their related network of welfare organizations. Part of the umbrella organization came to be known as "Rue Amelot" (the Paris address of the main office of its leading committee).

After the Rothschilds had fled the country, Jacques Helbronner, the acting vice-president of the Consistoire, became the de facto leader of native French Jewry (Rue Amelot was more collectively run by the heads of its various associations). In many ways Helbronner was a typical
representative of the old-stock French Jewish elite: a brilliant officer during World War I, a sharp legal mind who at a young age was appointed to the Conseil d'État (the highest civil service institution in France), Helbronner married into old (and substantial) French Jewish money. He belonged, quintessentially, to the French Jewish haute bourgeoisie, a group considered almost French by its non-Jewish surroundings. And despite his own genuine interest in Jewish matters—which led him to become active in the Consistoire—Helbronner, like all his peers, saw himself first and foremost as French. Typically enough, he was close to Philippe Pétain, since the day during World War I when, as head of the personal staff (chef de cabinet) of the minister of war, he was sent to inform Pétain of his appointment as généralissime (commander in chief of all French forces). Another friend of Helbronner’s was Jules-Marie Cardinal Gerlier, cardinal-archbishop of Lyon and head of the French episcopate. In March 1941 Helbronner was appointed president of the Consistoire.  

Few native French Jews achieved the exalted status of a Helbronner, but the great majority felt as deeply integrated in French society as he did and were to share the positions he adopted: France was their only conceivable national and cultural home, notwithstanding the injustice of the new laws. The growing antisemitism of the thirties and its most violent outbursts following the defeat were, in their opinion, caused in large part by the influx of foreign Jews; the situation thus created could be mitigated by a strict distinction between native French “separation” Jews and the foreign Jews living in the country.

It was precisely this difference that Helbronner attempted to convey to Pétain in a memorandum he sent him in November 1940, after the first statute and its corollaries had sunk in. In this statement, titled Note sur la question juive, the future president of the Consistoire argued that the Jews were not a race and did not descend from the Jews who had lived in Palestine two thousand years before. Rather, they were a community composed of many races and, as far as France was concerned, a community entirely integrated in its homeland. The problems began with the arrival of foreign Jews “who started to invade our soil.” The open-door policies of the postwar governments had been a mistake, and they resulted “in a normal antisemitism the victims of which were now the old French Israelite families.” Helbronner then suggested a series of measures that would free the native Jews from the limitations of the statute but not the foreign or recently naturalized Jews. Helbronner’s message went unanswered.

Over the following months the head of the Consistoire and a number of his colleagues pursued their futile and demeaning entreaties. The messages and visits to Vichy pointedly continued to ignore the fate of the foreign Jews and to plead for the French Israelites only. The epitome of this course of action was probably the solemn petition sent to the maréchal by the entire leadership of the Consistoire, including the chief rabbi of France. The closing paragraph was unambiguous in its omission of any reference to the non-French Jews:

Jewish Frenchmen still wish to believe that the persecutions of which they are the object are entirely imposed on the French State by the occupying authorities and that the representatives of France have tried their best to attenuate their rigors... Jewish Frenchmen, if they cannot safeguard the future and perhaps even the life of their children and grandchildren, but seeking above all to leave them honorable names, demand of the head of state who, as a great soldier and a fervent Christian, incarnates in their eyes the fatherland in all its purity, that
he should recognize this solemn protest, which is their only weapon in their weakness. Jewish Frenchmen, more than ever attached to their faith, keep intact their hope and their confidence in France and its destiny."29

The second Jewish statute was to be Vichy's answer to the petitions.

Time and again some of the most prestigious names of French Jewry confirmed that, in their view, the fate of the foreign Jews was none of their concern. Thus, when, during the spring of 1941, Dannecker started using pressure for the establishment of a unified Jewish Council, René Mayer, also a prominent member of the Consistoire (he would become a postwar French prime minister), asked Vallat to encourage the foreign Jews to emigrate.30 So did Marc Bloch, one of the most eminent historians of his time.

In April 1941, in response to a project promoted by the Consistoire envisioning the establishment of a center for Jewish studies, Bloch demanded that all trends within French Jewry be taken into account, but regarding the foreign Jews living in France, his stand was clear: “Their cause is not exactly our own.” Though unable to participate actively in the planning of the center, Bloch suggested that one of the main aims should be to counter the dangerous notion that “all Jews formed a solid homogeneous mass, endowed with identical traits, and subject to the same destiny.” In Bloch’s view the planners of the center should recognize two distinct Jewish communities, the assimilated (French) and the nonassimilated (foreign). While the fate of the former depended on its complete integration and the preservation of its legal guarantees, the survival of the latter might well depend on “some form of emigration.”31 ...

On July 22, “Aryanization” was introduced in the non-occupied zone according to the same criteria and methods used in the north. Businesses were liquidated or put under “French” control, assets were seized, and the proceeds were deposited in a special government bank, the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations.32 ...

For Darlan and Vallat this did not suffice. On the day the June statute was published, the registration of all Jews (according to the new definition) in the Vichy zone was mandated. According to Vallat’s estimate, approximately 140,000 Jews had been registered by the spring of 1942, although the head of the national office of statistics, René Carmille, had reached the much lower total of 109,000. The exact number of Jews living in the Vichy zone at that time is not clear. More immediately ominous was Darlan’s order of December 1941, to register all Jews who had entered France after January 1, 1936 (even those who had in the meantime acquired French citizenship); this identification was to become an essential element of the Franco-German agreements concerning the round-ups and deportations that were to come.33

On the morrow of the June statute, [Raymond-Raoul] Lambert [the head of the General Union of the Jews of France] noted that Pétain had met Helbronner and told him that all the measures had been ordered by the Germans. The marshal supposedly commented: “These are horrible people!” (Ce sont des gens épouvantables!). After some further remarks about the new measures, Lambert naively added: “One gets the feeling that even the details of the law have been inspired or dictated by the German authorities—as the Reich now considers the way France will solve the Jewish question as a test of its sincerity in the policies of collaboration.”34 Lambert did not yet dare to acknowledge that the initiative was French and the anti-Jewish decrees were indeed meant as a
proof—but one volunteered by Vichy—of its will to collaborate.

And while, during the summer and fall of 1941, the situation of the Jews in France looked more precarious by the month, the Germans made further attempts to convince the French population that the struggle against Jewry was a vital necessity. On September 5, a major antisemitic exhibition opened its doors in Paris. Officially it was organized by [Paul] Sézille's "Institute for the Study of Jewish Questions." Thus, it appeared as a French exhibition organized by a purely French institution. On the seventh Biélincky commented: "An antisemitic exhibition has just opened at the Palais Berlitz, on the Boulevards; a blustering advertisement campaign promotes it in the newspapers and on the walls. A Jewish female friend who does not look Semitic went to the opening and heard in the crowd: 'here at least, one is sure not to meet any Jews.'" The exhibition remained open through January 3, 1942, and drew more than three hundred thousand visitors (most of whom had to buy tickets), with indeed a few Jews among them. Apparently some of the Jewish visitors even dared to express open criticism.

The Germans however, did not stop at propaganda campaigns. On August 20, 1941, on German instructions, the Paris police arrested a further 4,230 Jews, mainly in the eleventh arrondissement; they were sent to Drancy, the newly established concentration camp near the French capital. This second roundup was probably undertaken in reprisal for the anti-German demonstrations organized in the city on August 13 by communist youth organizations; the police had supposedly noticed a substantial number of Jews among the demonstrators (the French police had ready lists of these Jews, as many had served in the French army in 1939–40). This time some French Jews, mainly communists, were also arrested...
deportations and the use of French police in the roundups. As Vichy did not appear ready to agree to either German demand, a serious crisis loomed during the last week of June; it brought Eichmann to Paris on June 30 for a reassessment. Finally, in a July 2 meeting with Oberg and his acolytes, Bousquet gave in to the Germans, and, on the fourth he conveyed Vichy's official stand. According to Dannecker's notes, "Bousquet declared that, at the recent cabinet meeting, Marshal Pétain, the head of the state, and Pierre Laval, the head of the government, agreed to the deportation, as a first step [dans un premier temps] of all stateless Jews from the Occupied and Unoccupied zones." French police forces would arrest the Jews in both zones. Moreover, as Dannecker reported on July 6, in a conversation with Eichmann, while all "stateless" Jews (that is, formerly German, Polish, Czecho- slovak, Russian, Lithuanian, Latvian, or Estonian Jews) were to be deported, Laval had also suggested, on his own initiative, the deportation of children under age sixteen from the unoccupied zone. As for children in the occupied zone, Laval declared that their fate was of no interest to him. Dannecker added that in a second phase, Jews naturalized after 1919 or after 1927 would be included in the deportations. 39

In this deal each party had its own agenda. The Germans were intent on achieving complete success both in Holland and in France, the first mass deportations from the West. They did not have sufficient police forces of their own on hand and had to rely on the full participation of each national police. For Laval, full collaboration had become his unquestioned policy in the hope of extracting a peace treaty from Germany and ensuring a rightful place for France within the new German-led Europe. And, in the late spring of 1942, as the head of the French government was maneuvering to deliver enough foreign Jews to postpone any decision regarding the fate of French Jews (whose deportation, he thought, French opinion would not readily accept), Hitler seemed, once more, to march on the road to victory.

On June 7, the star [i.e., Jews' wearing of the Star of David on clothing] became mandatory in the occupied zone of France. Vichy refused to enforce the decree on its territory, in order to avoid the accusation that a French government stigmatized Jews of French citizenship (the more so because Jewish nationals of countries allied with Germany, as well as of neutral or even enemy countries, were exempted from the star decree by the Germans). There was some irony and much embarrassment in the fact that Vichy had to beg the Germans to exempt the Jewish spouses of some of its highest officials in the occupied zone. Thus, Pétain's delegate in Paris, the antisemitic and actively collaborationist Fernand de Brinon, had to ask the favor for his wife, née Frank. 40 Among Catholic intellectuals, communists, and many students, reactions to the German measure were particularly negative. The Jews themselves quickly recognized the mood of part of the population and, at the outset at least, the star was worn with a measure of pride and defiance. 41

In fact, indications about French attitudes were contradictory: "Lazare Lévy, professor at the Conservatory, has been dismissed," Biélinky noted on February 20. "If his non-Jewish colleagues had expressed the wish to keep him, he would have remained as professor, as he was the only Jew at the Conservatory. But they did not make the move; cowardice has become a civic virtue." On May 16, Biélinky noted some strange inconsistencies in Parisian cultural life: "The Jews are eliminated from everywhere and yet René Julliard published a new book by Elian J. Finbert, La Vie Pastorale. Finbert is a Jew of Russian origin raised in Egypt. He is even young enough to inhabit a
concentration camp. . . . Although Jews are not allowed to exhibit their work anywhere, one finds Jewish artists at the Salon [the largest biannual painting exhibition in Paris]. They had to sign that they did not belong to the ‘Jewish race’. . . . A concert by Boris Zadri, a Romanian Jew, is announced for May 18, at the Salle Gaveau [a well-known Paris concert hall]. On May 19, Biélinky recorded the opinion voiced by a concierge: “What is done to the Jews is really disgusting. . . . If one didn’t want them, one should not have let them enter France; if they have been accepted for many years, one has to let them live as everybody else. . . . Moreover, they are no worse than we Catholics.” And, from early June on, Biélinky’s diary indeed recorded numerous expressions of sympathy addressed to him and to other Jews tagged with the star, in various everyday encounters.42

Yet individual manifestations of sympathy were not indicative of any basic shifts in public opinion regarding the anti-Jewish measures. Despite the negative response to the introduction of the star and soon thereafter to the deportations, an undercurrent of traditional antisemitism persisted in both zones. However, both the Germans and Vichy recognized that the population reacted differently to foreign and to French Jews. Thus in a survey that Abetz sent to Berlin on July 2, 1942, he emphasized “the surge of antisemitism” due to the influx of foreign Jews and recommended, along the lines of the agreement reached on the same day between Oberg and Bousquet, that the deportations should start with the foreign Jews in order to achieve “the right psychological effect” among the population.43

“I hate the Jews,” the writer Pierre Drieu la Rochelle was to confide to his diary on November 8, 1942. “I always knew that I hated them.”44 In this case at least, Drieu’s outburst remained hidden in his diary. On the eve of the war, however, he had been less discreet (but far less extreme) in Gilles, an autobiographical novel that became a classic of French literature. Compared to some of his literary peers, Drieu was in fact relatively moderate. In Les Décombres, published in the spring of 1942, Lucien Rebatet showed a more Nazi-like anti-Jewish rage: “Jewish spirit is in the intellectual life of France a poisonous weed that must be pulled out right to its most minuscule roots. . . . Auto-da-fés will be ordered for the greatest number of Jewish or Judaic works of literature, paintings, or musical compositions that have worked toward the decadence of our people.” Rebatet’s stand regarding the Jews was part and parcel of an unconditional allegiance to Hitler’s Reich: “I wish for the the victory of Germany because the war it is waging is my war, our war. . . . I don’t admire Germany for being Germany but for having produced Hitler. I praise it for having known how . . . to create for itself the political leader in whom I recognize my desires. I think that Hitler has conceived of a magnificent future for our continent, and I passionately want him to realize it.”45

Céline, possibly the most significant writer (in terms of literary importance) of this antisemitic phalanx, took up the same themes in an even more vitriolic form; however, his manic style and his insane outbursts marginalized him to a point. In December 1941, the German novelist Ernst Jünger encountered Céline at the German Institute in Paris: “He says,” Jünger noted, “how surprised and stupefied he is that we soldiers do not shoot, hang, exterminate the Jews—he is stupefied that someone availed of a bayonet should not make unrestricted use of it.” Jünger, no Nazi himself but nonetheless quite a connoisseur in matters of violence, strikingly defined Céline and—undoubtedly—also a vast category of his own compatriots: “Such men hear only one melody, but that is singularly insistent. They’re like
those machines that go about their business until somebody smashes them. It is curious to hear such minds speak of science—of biology, for instance. They use it the way the Stone Age man would; for them, it is exclusively a means of killing others. 46

Robert Brasillach was outwardly more polished, but his anti-Jewish hatred was no less extreme and persistent than that of Céline or Rebatet. His anti-Jewish tirades in Je Suis Partout had started in the 1930s, and for him the ecstatic admiration of German victories and German dominance had a clearly erotic dimension: “The French of different persuasions have all more or less been sleeping with the Germans during these last years,” he wrote in 1944, “and the memory will remain sweet.” As for the French and German policies regarding the Jews, Brasillach applauded at each step but, as far as the French measures went, they appeared to him at times too incomplete: “Families should be kept together and Jewish children deported with their parents,” he demanded in a notorious Je Suis Partout article on September 25, 1942. 47

How far the virulent antisemitism spewed by the Paris collaborationists influenced public opinion beyond the rather limited segment of French society that supported them politically is hard to assess. Be that as it may, Rebatet’s Les Décombres became a runaway bestseller . . . , the greatest publishing success in occupied France. 48 . . .

“The papers announce new measures against the Jews,” Jacques Biélinksy recorded on July 15, 1942: “They are forbidden access to restaurants, coffeehouses, movie theaters, theaters, concert halls, music halls, pools, beaches, museums, libraries, exhibitions, castles, historical monuments, sports events, races, parks, camping sites and even phone booths, fairs, etc. Rumor has it that Jewish men and women between ages eighteen and forty-five will be sent to forced labor in Germany.” 49

That same day the roundups of “stateless” Jews started in the provinces of the occupied zone, on the eve of the operation in Paris.

According to a July 15 report from the police chief of the Loire-Inférieure, French gendarmes were accompanying German soldiers on their way to arrest Jews in the department; according to another report of the same day, the French authorities were providing police officers to guard fifty-four Jews on the request of the ss chief of Saint-Nazaire. Jews arrested throughout the west of the country—among them some two hundred arrested in Tours, again on July 15—were taken to an assembly point in Angers (some were selected from French camps in the region) and, a few days later, a train carried 824 of them directly from Angers to Auschwitz. 50

On July 16, at 4:00 a.m., the Germano-French roundup of 27,000 “stateless” Jews living in the capital and its suburbs began. The index cards prepared by the French police had become essential: 25,334 cards were ready for Paris, and 2,027 for the immediate suburbs. 51 Every technical detail had been jointly prepared by French and German officials in their meetings on July 7 and 11. On the sixteenth fifty municipal buses were ready, and so were 4,500 French policemen. 52 No German units participated in the arrests. The manhunt received a code name: Vent printanier (Spring Wind).

As rumors about the forthcoming raids had spread, many potential victims (mostly men) had gone into hiding. 53 The origins of these rumors? To this day they remain uncertain, but as historian André Kaspi noted, “a roundup such as had never taken place in France, could not remain secret for long.” 54 UGIF employees, resistance groups, police personnel must all have been involved in some way in spreading warnings.

Nine hundred groups, each including three police officials and volunteers, were in charge of
the arrests. “Suddenly, I heard terrible banging on the front door . . . ,” Annette Müller, then nine years old, recalled. “Two men entered the room; they were tall and wore beige raincoats. ‘Hurry up, get dressed,’ they ordered, ‘we are taking you with us.’ I saw my mother get on her knees and embrace their legs, crying, begging: ‘Take me but, I beseech you, don’t take the children.’ They pulled her up. ‘Come on, madam, don’t make it more difficult and all will be well.’ My mother spread a large sheet on the floor, and threw in clothes, underwear. . . . She worked in a panic, throwing in things, then taking them out. ‘Hurry up!’ the policemen shouted. She wanted to take dried vegetables. ‘No, you don’t need that,’ the men said, just take food for two days; there, you will get food.”

By the afternoon of July 17, 3,031 Jewish men, 5,802 women, and 4,051 children had been arrested; the number of Jews finally caught in Vent printanier totaled 13,152. Unmarried people or childless couples were sent directly to Drancy; the others, 8,160 men, women, and children, were assembled in a large indoor sports arena known mainly for its bicycle races, the Vélodrome d’Hiver (Vel d’Hiv). At the Vel d’Hiv, nothing was ready—neither food, water, toilets, nor beds or bedding of any sort. For three to six days, thousands of hapless beings received one to two portions of soup per day. Two Jewish physicians and one Red Cross physician were in attendance. The temperature never fell below one hundred degrees Fahrenheit. Finally, group after group, the Vel d’Hiv Jews were temporarily sent to Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande camps just vacated by the inmates deported in June.

Vent printanier had not achieved the expected results. In order to keep Drancy stacked with Jews ready for deportation, the arrests of stateless Jews had to extend to the Vichy zone, as agreed by the French government. The major operation, again exclusively implemented by French forces (police, gendarmes, firemen, and soldiers), took place from August 26 to 28; some 7,100 Jews were seized. Although Laval had promised in early September to cancel the naturalization of Jews who had entered the country after January 1933, the roundups in the Vichy zone were aimed at filling the German quotas without having to start denaturalizing French citizens. By the end of the year 42,500 Jews had been deported from France to Auschwitz.

Until mid-1943 Drancy remained under French authority. The main goal for the camp administration remained filling the quotas imposed by the Germans for each departing transport. “Under our current obligation to come up with one thousand deportees on Monday,” a French police officer noted on September 12, 1942, “we must include in these departures, at least in reserve, the parents of sick [children] and advise them that they could be deported without their children remaining in the infirmary.”

On August 11, Untersturmführer Horst Ahnert, from Dannecker’s office, informed the RSHA that due to the temporary halt in the roundups, he planned to send the children assembled in the camps Beaune-la-Rolande and Pithiviers to Drancy, and asked for Berlin’s authorization. On the thirteenth, Gunther gave his approval but warned Ahnert not to send transports filled with children only.

It was probably the arrival of these children, aged two to twelve, that Drancy inmate George Wellers described after the war: “They were disembarked from the buses in the midst of the courtyard like small animals. . . . The elder children held the younger ones and did not let go of them until they reached their allocated places. On the stairs the bigger children carried the smaller ones, panting, to the fourth floor. There, they remained
fearfully huddled together. . . . Once the luggage had been unloaded the children returned to the courtyard, but most of the younger ones could not find their belongings; when, after their unsuccessful search they wished to get back to their rooms, they could not remember where they had been assigned. 60

On August 24, transport number 23 left Drancy for Auschwitz with its load of 1,000 Jews, including 553 children under age seventeen (288 boys and 265 girls). Among the children, 465 were under twelve, of whom 131 were under six. On arrival in Auschwitz, 92 men aged from twenty to forty-five were selected for work. All the other deportees were immediately gassed. Three Jews from this transport survived the war. 61

As a result of the only petition sent to Vichy by UGIF-North shortly after the Paris roundup, some relatives of war veterans and some “French children of foreign parents” (these were the words used in the petition) were released. André Baur, the president of UGIF-North, thanked Laval for his gesture. 62

On August 2, Lambert met Helbronner. Despite the ongoing roundups and deportations, the head of the Consistoire was not ready to share his contacts at Vichy with any member of UGIF nor to tell Lambert that in fact Laval was refusing to see him. In the course of the conversation, Helbronner declared to a stupefied Lambert that on August 8 he was going on vacation and that “nothing in the world would bring me back.” This declaration, quoted by Lambert only, has to be taken guardedly given the tense relations between the author and the Consistoire. “The president of the Consistoire seems to me to be more deaf, more pompous, and older than ever. The fate of the foreign Jews does not touch him at all,” Lambert added on September 6, describing another meeting with Helbronner, on July 30. 63 The remark about Helbronner’s attitude toward les juifs étrangers was probably on target.

In August, the Consistoire prepared two drafts of a protest letter. The milder version, not alluding to “extermination” (mentioned in the other draft) or to the participation of the French police or to that of the Germans, was delivered in Vichy on August 25, not to Laval to whom it was addressed and who once again refused to meet with the delegate of French Jewry, but to some low-ranking official. 64 That was all . . . .

Then, as in early 1943 the number of foreign Jews in France was rapidly dwindling and the weekly quotas of deportees were no longer met, the Germans decided to move to the next step: Pétain and Laval were now prodded to cancel the naturalizations of Jews that had taken place after 1927. It was at this point that unexpectedly, after first agreeing, Laval changed his mind.

The immediate reaction of the majority of ordinary French people to the roundups was unmistakably negative in both zones. 65 Although it did not lead to any organized protest, it did enhance readiness to help Jews on the run. Feelings of pity at the sight of the unfortunate victims, particularly women and children, spread, albeit briefly; but, as already mentioned, basic prejudice toward the Jews did not disappear. “The persecution of the Jews,” a February 1943 report from a Resistance agent stated, “has profoundly wounded the French in their humane principles; it has even, at times, made the Jews almost sympathetic. One cannot deny, however, that there is a Jewish question: the present circumstances have even helped plant it firmly. The Blum ministry, which was overflowing with Jewish elements, and the penetration of tens of thousands of foreign Jews into France, provoked a defensive mechanism in France. People would pay any price not to see a similar invasion repeated.” A March report from
another agent was almost identical in its main assessment. "The persecutions directed against the Jews have not stopped stirring and angering the population. Public opinion is nevertheless somewhat suspicious of them. It is feared that after the war some leading professions (banking, broadcasting, journalism, cinema) will be invaded again and in some fashion controlled by the Jews. Certainly, no one wants the Jews to be victimized and even less that they be molested. People sincerely want them to be as free as possible, in possession of their rights and property. But no one wants them to be supreme in any domain."66

Within the Resistance itself, the same kind of low-key antisemitism was present, even explicitly so. In June 1942, the first issue of Cahiers, published by the central body of the French underground, the OCM (Organisation Civile et Militaire), carried a study on ethnic minorities in France. The author, Maxime Blocq-Mascart, singled out the Jews as the group that caused "ongoing controversies": "Antisemitism in its moderate form was quasi universal, even in the most liberal societies. This indicates that its foundation is not imaginary." Blocq-Mascart's analysis brought up the usual repertory of anti-Jewish arguments and suggested the usual measures: "stopping Jewish immigration, avoiding the concentration of Jews in a small number of cities, encouraging complete assimilation." The article was widely debated and denounced by some high-ranking members of the underground; it nonetheless represented the opinion of a great majority of the French people.67

The Assembly of French cardinals and archbishops met in Paris on July 21, 1942, less than a week after the raid. A minority was in favor of some form of protest, but the majority, headed by Archbishop Achille Lienart of Lille and Cardinal Emmanuel Suhard of Paris, opposed it. Unsigned notes, drafted after the assembly, most probably by Lienart, indicate the main points of the discussion and the views of the majority. "Fated to disappear from the Continent. Those who support them are against us. The expulsions have been ordered. The answers: some belong to us; we keep them; the others, foreigners—we give them back. No, all have to leave by the action of our agencies, in both zones. Individualist project. Letter to our government out of sense of humanity. Help of social services to children in centers. They themselves ask only for charity from us. Letter addressed in name of humanity and religion."68

In other words the notes indicated that the French episcopate knew (probably on information received from the government or the Vatican) the Jews were fated to disappear from the Continent; whether this disappearance was understood as extermination is unclear. Support for the Jews, the note further mentioned, came mainly from segments of the population that were hostile to the church (communists? Gaullists?). The deportations have been ordered by the Germans; Vichy wants to keep the French Jews and have the foreigners expelled; the Germans insist on generalized deportation from both zones and demand the help of French agencies (mainly the police). The meaning of the words "individualist project" (Projet individualiste) is unclear but it could be that assistance to individuals was discussed. The bishops apparently believed that the caretaking of children would be implemented by French welfare agencies. The Jews, according to the notes, did not ask for anything else but charitable help (not for political intervention or public protest). A letter would be sent to the government in the spirit of the declaration issued by the assembly.

On July 22, Cardinal Suhard, in the name of the assembly, sent the letter to the maréchal. It was the first official protest of the Catholic church of France regarding the persecution of the Jews:
"Deeply moved by the information reaching us about the massive arrests of Israelites that took place last week and by the harsh treatment inflicted upon them, particularly at the Vélodrome d'Hiver, we cannot suppress the call of our conscience. It is in the name of humanity and of Christian principles that our voice is raised to protest in favor of the unalienable rights of human beings. It is also an anguish call for pity for this immense suffering, mainly for that of mothers and children. We ask you, Monsieur le Maréchal, to accept to take [our call] into account, so that the demand of justice and the right to charity be respected."

The papal nuncio in Vichy, Monsignor Valeri, considered the letter as rather "platonic." Helbronner thought so as well and beseeched his friend Gerlier to intervene personally with Pétain. After obfuscating for a while, the cardinal of Lyons (also prodded by Pastor Boegner) agreed to send a letter to the maréchal, and did so on August 19. But, like Suhard before him, Gerlier wrote in convoluted terms that could only indicate to Pétain and Laval that the French church would ultimately abstain from any forceful confrontation. Despite his promise to Helbronner, the cardinal did not ask for a meeting with Pétain.

In order to increase the number of deportees from France, the Germans were now pushing Vichy to adopt a law revoking the citizenship of Jews naturalized since 1927. But, after seemingly going along with the German scheme in the early summer of 1943, Laval rejected the new demand in August. Reports from the prefects had convinced the head of the Vichy government that public opinion would resent the handing over of French citizens (even recently naturalized ones) to the Germans.

Due to the importance of the issue, Laval informed Eichmann's men, the decision would have to be taken by the head of state himself. Pétain was of course aware of the possible reactions of the population. Moreover, he had been warned by the delegate of the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops, Henri Chappoulie, that the church would react negatively to any collective cancellation of the naturalization of Jews who had become French citizens after 1927. Finally, it is likely that by August 1943, when Pétain and Laval rejected the German demand, both—like everybody else beyond the borders of the Reich—simply perceived that the Germans were undoubtedly losing the war.

It is hard to assess which of these elements played a decisive role in determining Vichy's decision. A public opinion poll completed by the CGQI in the spring of 1943 on the demand of the government pointed to the existence of an absolute majority (more than 50 percent) of anti-Semites in the country. These results, which may have been manipulated by the Commissariat, have of course to be regarded cautiously; they did, however, confirm trends previously mentioned, although they did not tally with the prefects' reports about potential reactions to the cancellation of naturalizations.

The Germans were not deterred: They would start the deportation of French Jews. To that effect, Dannecker's successor, Obersturmbannführer Heinz Rothke, got reinforcement: Eichmann's special delegate, Alois Brunner, arrived directly from Salonika, where the deportation of almost the entire Jewish population had just been successfully completed. Accompanied by a special group of some twenty-five SS officers, Brunner would be in direct contact with Berlin. He immediately replaced the French officials in charge of Drancy with his own men.

On August 21, Lambert, his wife, and their four children were arrested and sent to Drancy; on December 7, they were deported to Auschwitz.
and murdered. Helbronner’s turn followed. On October 28, the Gestapo arrested the president of the Consistoire, Pétain’s and Gerlier’s friend, the most thoroughly French of all French Jews. Vichy was immediately informed, and so was Cardinal Gerlier. Helbronner and his wife were deported from Drancy to Auschwitz in transport number 62 that left French territory on November 20, 1943; they were gassed on arrival. Between October 28 and November 20, neither the Vichy authorities nor the head of the French Catholic Church intervened in any way.75 That Pétain did not intervene is not astonishing; that Gerlier abstained demonstrates that to the very end the leaders of the French church maintained their ambiguous attitude even toward those French Jews who were the closest to them.

NOTES

1. These numbers, all based on post—June 1940 computations, do not include some 10,000 to 15,000 Jewish prisoners of war, nor do they take into account that in the various censuses, a few thousand foreign Jews did not register. See André Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant l’occupation (Paris, 1991), 18ff.


3. A 1927 law had eased the naturalization process. The intention of Alibert’s commission was clear: Forty percent of the naturalizations that were cancelled were those of Jews. See Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944 (New York, 2001), 171.


5. For the full text of both laws, see ibid., 399–401.

6. Pétain’s own antisemitism was apparently fed by his wife (La Maréchale) and by his physician, Dr. Bernard Menetrel. See Denis Peschanski, Vichy, 1940–1944: Contrôle et exclusion (Bruxelles, 1997), 78.


11. In a book published in 1947, L’Église Catholique en France sous l’occupation, Monsignor Guerry himself reproduced the gist of the declaration, possibly without even perceiving its problematic aspect.

12. For example, the bishop of Grenoble and the archbishop of Chambery, ibid., 143 n. 11.

13. For a good summary of these attitudes, see François Delpech, “L’Épiscopat et la persecution des juifs et des étrangers,” in Églises et chrétiens dans la Ile Guerre mondiale (Lyon, 1978).


16. Herbert R. Lottman, La Rive gauche: Du Front populaire à la guerre froide (Paris, 1981), 303–4; Verdes-Leroux, Refus et violences, 149. All Jewish authors were excluded, whereas in many other cases the exclusion targeted only specific books.

17. See Lutz Raphael, “Die Pariser Universität unter deutscher Besatzung 1940–1944,” in Universitäten im nationalsozialistisch beherrschten Europa, ed. Dieter Langewiesche, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 23, no 4. (1997), 511–12, 522. Some protests against the anti-Jewish measures were expressed by a few faculty members ... (ibid., 523).


22. For details on the establishment of the CGQJ and on Vallat’s activities, see Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy et les juifs,* 79ff.

23. Ibid., 92ff.

24. For the full text of the law summed up here, see ibid., 402.


28. Ibid., 90ff.


38. For the chronology and most of the relevant documents see mainly Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz,* vol. 1 (Paris, 1981).


47. Quoted in Carroll, *French Literary Fascism,* 121.


53. On July 15, Biélinky noted in his diary: “It appears that Jews and Jewesses aged eighteen to forty-five are going to be arrested and sent to forced labor in Germany.” *Journal,* 233.


55. Quoted in ibid., 226–27.


58. Ibid., 255.


65. For some of the préfets’ reports about reactions in their districts, see Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz*, vol. 1, 305ff.


68. The notes are published in Cointet, *L’Église Sous Vichy*, 224.


70. Cointet, *L’Église Sous Vichy*, 266. For Valerio Valeri’s letter to Maglione, where the expression is used, see Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz*, vol. 1, 297.


